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The Week

LLOYD GEORGE exhibits his usual adroitness in his pronouncements on Russian policy. "Bolshevism cannot be crushed by force of arms," he has believed for over a year, but of course he was not so dogmatic in this belief as to refuse a chance to the anti-Bolshevists, who failed, not for want of equipment, but for reasons more fundamental. Also, Mr. George believes that the "ring of fire" composed of the border states pressed to war against Russia, is an impossible solution. Neither do the states want to provide the men nor do the great powers want to provide the money. Real war with the Soviet government is impracticable, but so is real peace. "Until they are assured the Bolsheviki have dropped the methods of barbarism in favor of civilized government, no civilized community in the world is prepared to make peace with them." Mr. George does not say "until the Bolsheviki have dropped barbaric methods," but until the other governments are assured of this.

LORD ROBERT CECIL proposes the sending of an international commission to Russia to find out exactly what Russian conditions are. This proposal may perhaps be regarded as complementary to Lloyd George's policy. Such a commission would not only find out that the Soviet government is not now employing the terror, but it could also negotiate for amnesty for the unfortunate Russian emigrés who with Allied encouragement backed the defunct enterprises of Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenitch. So far as we can ascertain, peace with amnesty is the policy which the emigrés—at least the more level-headed ones—are now urging. Many of them would welcome an opportunity to return to Russia, to serve their country even under the Soviet government which they disapprove and distrust, as General Kuropatkin and a long list of distinguished anti-communists are serving it, in both military and civil offices.

BRITISH opinion and French are drifting apart on three important issues: Russia, the demand upon Germany for the men accused of war crimes, and the question of the revision of the peace terms. The British, having already abandoned all idea of armed intervention, are now visibly preparing the ground for peace with the Soviet government. France cannot keep up the fight alone, but she is far from reconciled to the peace. The British, it is understood, wished to limit the demand for those to be tried for war crimes to a few men against whom a strong prima facie case could be made. The French made out a long list, knowing that Germany would demur, and perhaps refuse, thereby laying a moral basis for French retention of the left bank of the Rhine as a permanent possession. The British view apparently has prevailed in the decision to permit the Germans to try the war criminals themselves, with the right to determine whether the trials are fair and the penalties adequate.

IN the matter of revising the peace terms, while the British government has a strong majority in Parliament against such action, the movement for reducing the indemnity and giving Germany a

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chance to work it off is growing in England. Opinion in Paris is that the original peace terms were already too lenient. L'Eclaire, edited by Briand, says: "To revise the treaty is a very good thing if the corrections are to be made in favor of the conquerors; but we greatly fear that such a procedure would result in advantages for the conquered." England in each of the cases of disagreement inclines more toward peace, France to prolonging the regime of force. It is difficult to predict which tendency will be the more powerful if the proposed Anglo-French-American military alliance ever becomes a reality.

WHAT has become of that alliance, anyway? Occasionally one encounters references to it in French political discussion, as if it were an existing fact. President Wilson agreed to submit such a treaty to the Senate in part consideration for French acceptance of the League and technical renunciation of the Rhine as a frontier. It must be submitted to the Senate for ratification as soon as the League is disposed of. What are its chances? The American Senate will be putting the interests of the country in jeopardy if it lets us in for such an entanglement. A vast majority of Americans will agree that if France, doing her best to live at peace with Germany, is wantonly attacked, America ought to go to her relief straightway. But suppose that France decides to prolong indefinitely the retention of the Rhine frontier or to juggle the Saar Valley plebiscite: what then? Shall we find ourselves bound to send our armies to defend her in such an enterprise?

FOR the relief of the starving in the new states of Central Europe and Armenia at least $125,000,000 is imperatively needed, according to the most conservative expert estimates. There is grave danger that Congress will refuse to appropriate this sum, or anything near it. Retrenchment in public expenditures is one of the reasons why Congress is reluctant to vote liberal relief funds, but another and more creditable reason is the fear that much of the relief given will be diverted, directly or indirectly, to the furthering of military enterprises. The testimony of General Bliss that the Poles are holding a line from 280 to 380 kilometers east of the boundaries fixed by the peace conference, thus in effect inviting attack from the Russians, dampened considerably the ardor of those Congressmen who favored relief for Poland. General Bliss proposed that if we gave the Poles food we should require France and England to give them arms; but neither was that proposal reassuring. The way out was indicated by the proposal of Representative Green, that as a condition of relief for Poland, the Poles should retire within their proper boundaries.

WHILE England and France are debating whether or not the border states are to fight Russia, there are signs that in the border states themselves there is growing opposition to the continuance of hostilities. Esthonia, of course, has already made peace with Soviet Russia, and commerce has been begun. What Latvia intends doing is not certain. An Associated Press dispatch from London says that no peace offer will be accepted pending a Baltic conference to be held in April. But Soviet troops have been withdrawn, and the American State Department has unofficial news of the signing of an armistice. Meantime the government of Poland is reported by the Associated Press to be preparing an outline of its peace conditions. The Socialists and labor groups threaten a general strike unless peace is made; and the Premier, replying to a delegation of their representatives, declares the government is considering peace "in all seriousness."

THE southern front of the anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia seems to have collapsed entirely; and for Denikin's failure, as for Kolchak's, we are beginning to get explanations that blast the myths of last summer's propaganda. Lieutenant Leslie Harkness of the American Red Cross returns to Paris after three months with the anti-Bolshevist armies in the south and attributes the collapse of Denikin to four causes. For the spread of typhus Denikin can not be held responsible; and certain strategic military mistakes were perhaps bound to happen. But the other two causes cited by Lieutenant Harkness are significant. The peasants, he says, were indifferent to Denikin's venture—those same peasants who were to rush enthusiastically into the Holy Crusade. And then, besides, Denikin made the mistake—a serious mistake for the crusader—of permitting his Cossacks "to sack each captured city for three days."

TO the character of Rumanian rule in Hungary most American newspapers have been indifferent. General Bandholtz of the American army now comes out of Hungary, however, with a report that corroborates the news dispatches printed in a few such English papers as the Manchester Guardian. The Rumanians, he says, have never carried out their promise to leave Hungary. They have simply moved some thirty miles from Budapest and stopped there. Meantime they have robbed the country of almost everything that was movable: food, tools, seed, freight cars, animals and even Gobelin tapestries. That the Rumanians were not

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out simply to replace war losses of their own is shown in the fact that they would smash two or three essential machines in a factory and thus tie up the whole plant. The Rumanians have wanted to injure Hungary. They have done it. And they have prepared the ground for another war that may rack Europe.

THERE are American Senators of both parties who believe that the controversy over Article X has become a war of words and nothing more. What is the practical difference, they ask, between Mr. Hitchcock's reservations and Mr. Lodge's? It is interesting to note the way this question is answered by twenty deans of law colleges and heads of English departments in different universities when the New York Globe asked for their opinions. Six say that the two reservations mean virtually the same thing. Six say unequivocally that they mean different things entirely. The others do not state specifically whether they believe the reservations alike or different in meaning, but make distinctions in the phraseology of the reservations and interpret them differently. The Globe's questionnaire serves to show again what real confusion there is in the American mind about reservations to Article X, about the meaning of the Article itself, and the share of responsibility to which it pledges this country.

APPARENTLY the Republicans are no more ready than the Democrats to burn their fingers on the issue of compulsory military training. Passage of such legislation, say the Republican leaders after a meeting of the Steering Committee, is impossible in the present Congress. Nevertheless, there is a good-sized body of sentiment in favor of compulsory training; and the Republicans, as usual, want to capture the pro's without losing the anti's. So a "special committee" is to be appointed, which is "to study the question" and report to the next Congress. Congressmen of both parties are now enlarging upon the "educational values" inherent in compulsory training. It ought indeed to have a few such values. Senator Wadsworth estimates it would cost six hundred and fifty million dollars a year—and that is more than the whole country spent for all public school purposes in 1915.

ON Friday the newspapers announced that Attorney-General Newton had proposed criminal proceedings against the five suspended Socialist Assemblymen at Albany. But on Saturday, faced with a threat from the Socialists to put in no defense at their trial before the Judiciary Committee, the Attorney-General's office issued what the World calls a "diplomatic disclaimer" of any intent to hasten criminal proceedings. In the brief filed by Mr. Newton a pretense is made of summing up the evidence disclosed at the inquiry. But a large part of the public will not easily be persuaded that the evidence has shown these five Assemblymen to be plotting the forcible overthrow of the American state and "the substitution of the Russian Soviet Government." Mr. Newton should have ended his brief after his first two charges. For the evidence at Albany did show that some Socialists (not necessarily these five) have handed in undated resignations to their parties before taking office; and that most Socialists—like most Quakers, pacifists and non-resistants—do not "vote to appropriate moneys for military or naval purposes of war."

GRADUALLY the Department of Justice is being educated to the fact of difference even among revolutionaries. The twenty-nine men recently arrested at Paterson "are not like the Russian workers or communists," says a statement issued by the Department. "They are anarchists of the worst type, not philosophical anarchists, such as the Ferrer colony at Stelton, nor the so-called constructive anarchists, but these are the 'terrorists' to be compared with the nihilists of Russia." The Department of Justice might have added, these are the anarchists of the kind that Lenin suppressed with great vigor. These are the sort that issued—as a vile joke on the centralizing tendencies of the Bolsheviki—that canard on the nationalization of women still taken seriously by multitudes of Americans otherwise exhibiting a sense of humor.

WHEN the coal-miners took issue with their employers, a few months ago, we were accustomed to see on the first pages of the newspapers such headlines as "Miners Defy Government." The President's settlement commission is now at work: what happens when the commission decides that the 14 per cent wage increase in the Kentucky fields shall be retroactive to October 1st, and the Kentucky operators refuse to accept that decision? Do the New York newspapers announce in first-page headlines: "Operators Defy Government"? No. None of them have room for more than a three inch item and in each case, that is tucked away far from the front page. The claim of the Kentucky miners to a retroactive wage increase was based on the fact that throughout the strike the Kentucky mines were operated on practically a 100 per cent basis. This latter fact, incidentally, the Times deletes from the short account it publishes.

ASSISTANT Postmaster-General Blakeslee informs the Senate that among the farmers of the country there is a temper "disquiet-

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ing and portentous of disastrous consequences." This opinion he bases upon a review of 40,000 replies to a questionnaire recently sent out by the Post Office Department. Dissatisfaction among the farmers, as shown in these replies, is due to three major causes: inability to obtain labor, objection to high profits taken by middlemen, and lack of proper agencies of contact between the farmer and consumer. However difficult it may be to turn workmen back to the soil, there are at least ways of meeting the second and third causes of discontent. Taxation will touch the high profits of middlemen; development of cooperative sale and purchase will bring the farmers in closer touch with their markets. Will the Republicans and the Democrats go to the farmers with this program?

TWO weeks ago we published the appeal of a Hungarian war prisoner in Siberia in behalf of several hundred thousand fellow sufferers who have almost abandoned hope of seeing their homes again. Word reaches us now that the American Y. M. C. A. is ready to help repatriating these prisoners, but that the permit of the American government is needed before any action can be taken. The case of these unfortunate men surely deserves the granting of such a permit. There are perhaps a hundred thousand prisoners east of Lake Baikal, and double that number to the west. Most of them have been prisoners in Siberia for four years. They are performing no useful service. They are without money and proper clothing. Cholera and typhoid have carried away many of their comrades. And now, for a year and a half, all communication with home and family has been denied them. If the Y. M. C. A. can help any of them reach their homes again, it deserves the gratitude of every humane government.

Mr. Lansing and the Cabinet

FOR many months the office of President has been filled by a man so dangerously ill that he has been allowed to know only what his wife and his doctor and perhaps his secretary thought it wise to tell him. The members of his cabinet have had no access to him. The leaders of his party have been out of touch with him. He has lain there unadvised, uninformed, wilfully alone, unfriended by men who could save him from himself, shrouded in secrecy, amid the wreck of the highest hope ever indulged by a statesman. Remembering all this it is not easy to discuss plainly the incoherent correspondence with Mr. Lansing. For the ordinary standards of public criticism do not apply to the chance exposure of what is really an incident of the sick room.

Yet in those pitiable letters is written the morbid exaggeration of Mr. Wilson's theory of government. "Is it true, as I have been told" that the chiefs of departments have conferred without me? If it is true, as I have been told, then I have to remind you "that no action could be taken without me by the cabinet, and therefore there could have been no disadvantage in awaiting action with regard to matters concerning which action could not have been taken without me?" Thus sharply and unconsciously revealed is the doctrine of personal government. The President has not been too ill to be told some disturbing things about the government. But the members of his cabinet have not been permitted to tell them to him. Between him and them have been interposed his real confidants. The cabinet are an external group to whom orders are given, and not the intimate and responsible stewards of the vast powers which have accumulated in the Presidency.

Too ill to discuss affairs of state with his Secretary of State, he has not been too ill to discuss them with others. He has made up his mind, not on the advice of those who are officially his advisers, but after hearing what those who were about the sick room found advisable to repeat. There is nothing new in this. Illness and disappointment have merely emphasized it. The President has never had a cabinet in any substantial sense, and it is a measure of the compensating power of the human mind that he should lecture Mr. Lansing about the development of constitutional systems. Having himself perverted healthy constitutional practice, he picks a quarrel with his leading cabinet member for attempting somewhat to restore it. In these letters is set down for the first time the theory of an irresponsible and impotent cabinet.

Only the bad judgment of a sick man could have induced Mr. Wilson to put this theory into cold print. It has actually been the working theory of his administration. On one side a maze of public questions. On the other a glut of power in the Presidency. Elected to the Presidency a man subject to the persistent delusion that the enunciation of a policy was the execution of a policy. This delusion inhibiting his relation to men and making him careless in their selection. Having selected them badly, having watched his policies go wrong in practice when administered by them, the moral he drew from his experience was not that he must choose other men, but that he could not trust those he had. Thus he was confirmed in an obstinate loyalty to men to whom he was not loyal. He did

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not rid himself of incompetents. He ignored them. He ignored them believing they could be ignored. Having failed to secure administrators of his policy, he relapsed more and more into the enunciation of policy. But administration went on, nevertheless. It went on ignored by the President. It went wild and at cross purposes. The vast powers of his office were distributed in fragments through the departments, assumed here by the General Staff, there by a subordinate postmaster, and at another point by a bureau chief.

The cabinet had not exercised the powers of the President's office, because he had made it plain to the cabinet that they were not really trusted. Because they had lost the confidence of their chief, they lost the confidence of their subordinates. For the last year, or longer, the Wilson administration has been a case of split personality, of many souls contending in one body. And like the split personalities of psychopathology one fragment has been ignorant of, or impotent to control, the action of the other. That is why the world has been treated to the amazing spectacle of perfectly splendid promises smiling like a summer sky upon a scene of disorder, broken faith, and intolerance. The frustrated cabinet has been divided between weak men and wild men, between men who conscientiously accepted the theory of their impotence and men who took advantage of the screen between the White House and events to promote their ambitions and their animosities.

That this condition should exist, and that it will continue another twelve months, is serious. That it has been aggravated by the temperament of Mr. Wilson, and that his temperament has been aggravated by his failure and his illness ought not to conceal the permanent meaning of it all. It should not be possible for any President to reduce his cabinet to so inconsequential a position. He is able to do so because they are his personal appointees, and responsible to no one but him. If he is a personally minded man, as Mr. Wilson is, as General Leonard Wood is, he will treat his secretaries of state as if they were subordinate private secretaries. He alone can appoint them, he alone dismisses them, they are in the last analysis answerable only to him. There can be no permanent dignity in such an office, or power to attract the ablest men. Nor will able men willingly place themselves where they are irresponsible to Congress, yet subject to its constant attacks. The position of the cabinet in our government has become anarchical; it needs to be institutionalized. The effectiveness of the cabinet and the effectiveness of Congress both require it. It is not possible to conduct government in the modern state through cabinet officers who have a purely personal relation to an irremovable President. Inevitably the personal power of the President is magnified out of all relation to any human being's actual ability to exercise it. Thus magnified he becomes a kind of vampire on administration, draining it of vitality, responsibility, and initiative.

The government at Washington has become hopelessly top heavy. It urgently needs to be decentralized, and the place to begin is with the cabinet. The visible sign of such decentralization would be to give the cabinet officer the right to appear on the floor of the House and the Senate, the right of the Senate and the House to question him. The natural development of that would be the custom of resigning when in vital matters the Secretary no longer had the support of Congress. That ultimately this might lead to a radical change in the form of the federal government is undeniable. It might lead to a very drastic curtailment of the President's powers. It might lead to the development of a cabinet officer who was in fact a prime minister. That bridge can be crossed if and when we come to it. The present need is to take steps which will distribute the powers of the President among department heads who are really responsible because they exercise direct and not merely indirect powers. The present need is also to restore the effective functions of Congress and thereby to improve its personnel. It is not possible to proceed indefinitely through troubled times with legislature and executive deadlocked, and the executive a personal prerogative. You can not tie up the powers of government in the hands of one irremovable man, when he is mortal.

The Defeat of the Treaty

SINCE it was defeated in the Senate last November, the Treaty has been dying in Europe. It is repudiated today by those forces of labor and liberalism to whom the future government of Europe belongs. So complete is the discredit, that the French Foreign Office, recognizing that England and America will not abet it in the vain effort to enforce the Treaty, has already taken steps to use the great joker. Premier Millerand has turned to Part XIV headed "Guarantees." He has taken the first steps under Articles 428 and following by which France can annex the left bank of the Rhine. For under the terms of the Treaty, France is permitted to retain the left bank and the bridgeheads "if the conditions of the present Treaty are 'not' faithfully carried out." Many of the conditions being utterly impossible to carry out, France is now

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laying the basis of her legal claim to the annexation of the Rhineland. This is a sign of desperation, and marks the beginning of the end.

The Senate is thus confronted with a state of things quite different from that which existed last November. Then there were only scattered voices in the western countries insisting that the Treaty was absurd and that it was dangerous if enforced. They argued that it could never be executed without the use of American force, and that Europe would not learn the dangers of the Treaty unless it was faced with the possibility of having to enforce it alone. The delay in the Senate has had just that result, and far more quickly than any one anticipated. The muddle and obstruction in the Senate have done more to educate the world as to the meaning of what happened at Versailles and what must be done to remedy it, than could possibly have been done by Ambassador Wallace sitting in the Council of a League engaged in enforcing the Treaty. The political withdrawal of the United States is rapidly forcing Europe into rediscovering its own equilibrium by the reversal of the two great blunders of Versailles: the Russian blunder and the German. Its judgment no longer clouded by illusions as to American assistance, Europe moves rapidly towards peace with Russia and towards revision of the peace with Germany.

Considering the mental condition of the Executive departments, the paralysis of the diplomatic service, the inability of this administration any longer to speak for the country, considering also the fact that the Treaty is all but dead in Europe, the Senate would, in our judgment, err if it left the smallest doubt that America accepts no obligations whatever to enforce the Treaty. Under the new circumstances we ought not to permit any one to think that we shall directly or indirectly pledge ourselves to uphold the settlement. Both for her own sake and for the sake of the world, America ought not at this date to give even the slightest moral sanction to a document that will go down through history as a practical failure and a monstrous breach of faith.

The claim that further delay, or complete defeat of the Treaty, or ratification with fundamental reservations means the death of the League of Nations is a claim for which we cannot find the proof. Tied to this Treaty, at the mercy of the autocratic Reparations Commission, composed of diplomats who have broken faith, an organization called a League would not only fail to keep the peace, but would discredit for generations the very idea of a League. The idea of a League is today established in the hearts of the mass of men. It will not die, unless it is perverted and exploited by diplomats who regard it with cynical contempt.

The Railway Crisis Postponed

IF the railway crisis through which we are once more passing reflected no more than a difference between the railway employees and their immediate employer, the United States Railroad Administration, the situation might be serious perhaps, but it would not be desperate. There would be threats and ultimatums, much manoeuvering for advantage, and a certain amount of anxiety as to the outcome, but in the end, since Mr. Hines is neither a bigot nor a candidate for the Presidency, there would be a practical and mutually acceptable compromise.

But the railway employees have no legitimate complaint against the Director General of Railways. He could not in fairness be asked to grant large wage increases during the last few days of federal control, thus in effect projecting his jurisdiction far beyond the period set by the President. Mr. Hines is not responsible for the conditions under which the private companies are to operate their railways after March 1st. Railway employees have a grievance, and it is a large and a just grievance, against the whole policy of the Government in its relation to the railroad problem, a policy for which responsibility rests not with Mr. Hines, nor even with the President, but with Congress, and beyond Congress, with the public which has allowed Congress to trifle while the ship was heading for the rocks.

To appreciate the strength of the railway employees' case it is only necessary to compare what the government is proposing to do for them, with the elaborate safeguards which Congress is devising to protect the stockholders. In its anxiety to protect the rights of capital, Congress is proposing to abandon the wholesome traditions of half a century by guaranteeing, out of the public treasury, the pre-war profits of the railways for six months after the termination of federal control. There is no guarantee to the railway employees of a wage sufficient to maintain their pre-war standard of living.

Congress is proposing to give the Interstate Commerce Commission mandatory instructions to fix freight rates which will be sufficient to pay operating cost, and besides to bring in five and a half per cent on the value of the railroads. There is no direction to the railroads to pay wages which will enable the employees to meet even their reasonable living expenses. Capital is treated with marked solicitude; labor is delivered to the tender mercies of the private corporations without a substantial safeguard beyond the power of its own organization.

This discrepancy in the Esch-Cummins bill be-

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tween the treatment of capital and the treatment of labor is more than a mere talking point. Despite the popular impression to the contrary, large sections of railway labor will emerge from federal control with earnings, in terms of purchasing power, substantially smaller than before the war, with wages lower than in corresponding industries which remained under private control, and with annual incomes insufficient to meet the bare expenses of family life under the American standard. The daily wage rate of locomotive firemen, to take a conspicuous example, has increased since December, 1914, on an average throughout the United States only 47.4 per cent. During this period the cost of a workingman's budget, has increased approximately 85 per cent. During this time, also, the wages of common laborers in the iron and steel industry have gone up, according to calculations of the Bureau of Applied Economics, 141 per cent; the wages of sheet metal workers in shipyards 166 per cent, the wages of longshoremen 86 per cent, and many others proportionally. Both relatively and absolutely, the locomotive firemen have been steadily dropping behind. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, after an investigation conducted in the District of Columbia last August, concluded that the minimum budget under American standards for a family of five, exercising the highest degree of thrift and housekeeping ability, was $2,025, a figure which allowed nothing for savings. The annual earnings of the average locomotive fireman, assuming that he is not sick a single day in the year, are slightly under $1,400.

It is not surprising, then, that the locomotive firemen believe themselves entitled to a substantial increase in wages. Nor is it surprising that they, in common with the rest of railroad labor, are concerned at the prospect of a return to private ownership without any such assured status as Congress has tried to give to capital.

Yet the grievance of the railway employees lies even deeper. Not only has Congress failed to give them any assurance of a fair living wage, but it is responsible for the continuation of a railway policy under which it is highly problematical whether any but the strongest and most favorably located roads can pay a living wage to labor. For many commodities there is a limit beyond which the traffic will not bear an increase in freight rates. Many of the weaker railways, relying on highly competitive business, may prove to be in a position where payment of a living wage will drive them to the wall. The railway unions have urged Congress to bring about a financial consolidation of the railways, to substitute for the wasteful and expensive methods of private financing a direct and economical system of public ownership and public financial responsibility, and to put an end to the socially wasteful competitive system of operation which prevailed before the war, so that money which should go toward paying a living wage, may no longer be diverted into wasteful expense of competition and unnecessary capital charges. But Congress has contemptuously dismissed their plea.

It is because Congress has refused to face the problem of railway reorganization in a radical and thoroughgoing way, and has ignored the fact that a living wage to labor is as necessary in a healthy railway system as a fair return to capital, that the labor crisis on the railroads is becoming truly desperate. The President, in his offer to the railway unions, has gone as far as his limited powers permit, but it is not far. He has promised to use his influence to bring about a rapid organization of the railway wage machinery in the pending railway legislation. But the boards and commissions which that machinery sets up apparently have no power to compel the railway companies to adopt their findings, and they are to receive no mandatory instructions to fix a living wage. If no such machinery is set up in the Esch-Cummins bill, the President agrees to use his influence with the railway companies to bring about the voluntary establishment of a wage board. In the meantime he will constitute a committee of experts, for his own guidance, to report on the facts, "with due regard to" wages in other industries, to the higher cost of living, and to a living wage under present conditions. The committee of experts, of course, will have no power, and the joint wage board, apparently, no instructions.

It is not surprising that the Brotherhoods are not satisfied with the President's offer. The proposition which they have agreed to submit to their organizations is a very different one. They will propose to their constituencies, on February 23rd, a special joint commission, representing both railroads and unions, and "invested with full authority" to deal with the controversy, not only "with due regard to" the factors mentioned by the President, but "on the basis of" rates of pay in other industries, of the increased cost of living, of a basic minimum living wage, with differentials for extra skill, responsibility or hazard. In other words they desire a commission with full authority to act, and with instructions which would virtually compel them to grant the wage demands which the railway employees are now making. And they ask the President to secure the agreement of the railway officials to this proposal by February 23rd. It is apparent that with only a shadowy "influence," and no legal power, the President will find some difficulty in persuading the railway officials to accept.

The crisis, therefore, is at best postponed for a

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few weeks. As soon as the railroads are returned to private control, the railway companies and the unions will again stand face to face, as they did in the months before the war, with irreconcilable demands, and with no power in any government official to intervene and protect the public interest. In one important respect the situation will be worse than it was in 1916 and 1917. The government guarantee which Congress is so recklessly incorporating in the Esch-Cummins bill will throw the whole financial cost of a railroad strike on the United States treasury. Unless Congress intervenes the railroad corporations will be in a position to sit back and do nothing until the employees are starved into submission, while their own expenses and profits are guaranteed by the government. Into such straits has the Congressional policy of timid tinkering brought the railways of the country.

Labor in Politics

LABOR is going into politics. That is certain, and what is equally certain is that labor is needed in politics. Whatever may have been the case for political aloofness in the time when the unions were in their infancy, there is no sufficient case for aloofness today, when organized labor has waxed great and powerful and when politics and government must inevitably deal with labor issues. As labor organization extends, the interest of the public, that is the national political interest, becomes more and more deeply involved. The government could not have kept its hands off the coal strike, because the national prosperity depended on the coal supply. It will not be able to keep its hands off if the threatened railway strike materializes. It is vital to labor that the government should act in such matters with intelligent sympathy. And there is no guarantee of this unless labor assumes an active role in politics.

But how can it best exert its influence? British labor has adopted one method: the American Federation under the leadership of Mr. Gompers proposes to adopt another. The British method is to organize an independent party and fight a way to participation in the government, with the ultimate aim of effective control. Mr. Gompers's method is that of working through the existing non-labor parties. "Help our friends, punish our enemies." In each constituency both the Republicans and Democrats will have to reckon with the labor influence in the primaries and the nominating conventions, where the best effort will be made to defeat the candidates whose record or promises are not pleasing to labor. Where both parties nominate "friends of labor," the labor vote may be neutral in the final election. But where there is a distinction between the two candidates on the score of friendliness to labor, the leaders of labor will try to throw all labor votes to the friend, or to the better friend of the two. That looks like a plan capable of producing immediate results, if carried out according to the program. In a majority of the states and in a greater majority of the Congressional districts the existing margin between the majority and the minority party is not so wide as to preclude the possibility that organized labor and its sympathizers might overcome it. Two or three million disposable votes, distributed among the states as organized labor is distributed, might well determine the outcome of the Presidential election, as well as that of a majority of the Congressional elections. If Mr. Gompers can deliver the goods, we are likely to find our government well stuffed with "friends of labor."

That is better, to be sure, than to have the government stuffed with enemies of labor. But let us look more closely to the remoter consequences before we content ourselves with this modicum of progress. We are not now for the first time experimenting with bipartisan leverage. The method has been employed again and again in our history. When the Civil War veterans were seeking more liberal pension laws they pursued a similar policy of helping their friends and punishing their enemies. Their friends might be greedy protectionists or extreme free traders; they might be for regulation of the great corporations or for laissez-faire: it was all one to this body of voters so long as they could be counted on to vote "right" on pensions. The bipartisan corporate machines that used to figure so heavily in the politics of many of our states had the same experience. They helped the friends of the corporations, though these men might also happen to be friends of the brothels and the gambling hells. A "friend of labor" must be opposed to the use of injunctions in labor disputes. He must support laws favoring the liberal treatment of government employees; he must be friendly toward the short hours movement, toward the restriction of child labor, etc. That is very good, so far. But beyond that he may be a rabid protectionist, a "little American," a devotee of universal service, a Mexican interventionist, an advocate of fiat money or what not. Or worse still he may be a congenital dunderhead, incapable of making any intelligent contribution to any constructive policy whatever.

It may be said that labor will expect its friends to be "right" not only on questions directly concerning labor but on general political questions as well. It may indeed expect that, but will it in fact set out to defeat a man who is "right" on labor

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issues and wrong on general national issues? Will it balance nicely the high personal integrity and general intelligence of a candidate who stands up for the use of the injunction against the stupidity and general crookedness of another candidate who can be counted on to vote for laws restricting the use of the injunction? If it did so, this method of exerting political influence would fail. So many laborers would vote simply for the better man that it would hardly be worth while to be a "friend of labor." Any group which tries to do a political business in "friends" will sooner or later discover that there is a fairly definite law governing that kind of traffic. That law is that so long as your political friend puts over for you what you particularly want, you must wink at his putting over something else for himself, or for some other group that also has contracted friendship with him. But that is the fundamental principle of American political irresponsibility. In so far as it operates it makes of America not a democracy, but an oligarchy of cliques, more or less self seeking. Such a perversion of democracy did not appear objectionable to the bipartisan rings that looked after the interests of the corporations, nor even to the corporation presidents and dominant stockholders. It is incongruous with the professions and the ultimate interests of labor. Indeed, it is too incongruous to work very effectively through any long period of time. What can be gained by it comes at too high a price.

For after all, not a great deal can be gained in this way. A Congress with a majority of "friends" would throw sops to labor; it would talk a great deal, very amicably; it would enact friendly laws that it knew would be declared unconstitutional. There is not the remotest chance that it would seriously go to work to devise a thoroughgoing plan of industrial reform that would give labor its rightful place in our democracy.

But what of the alternative, an independent labor party? Let it be granted that at the first election a labor party, even though backed by the American Federation would make but a small showing. It might not win more than half a dozen seats in Congress, not even enough to embarrass the majority party. But this half dozen could do an immensely important work of criticism, not only of labor measures but of general legislation as well. And thus experience would be acquired on the basis of which a better balanced, more practical platform could be prepared for the succeeding election. In four years or six labor might easily come to hold the balance between the two traditional parties and thus be in a position not only to block legislation inimical to labor, but also to begin on a positive program of industrial reform. It is only twenty-seven years since the British labor party was organized. Today that party is pressing forward to the control of the government. Apparently it is a question of only a few years—possibly only of months—before England will be governed by a labor ministry.

That cannot happen in America, some one will say. Why not? Are we better satisfied with the Republican and Democratic parties than the voters of England were with their Conservatives and Liberals? There are millions of Americans, not members of labor organizations, who would be glad to see such a new and virile element injected into our politics as a real labor party. We are sick of having to draw distinctions between Tweedledee and Tweedledum. Give us something real to vote for, or against.

Labor cannot afford to jockey itself into the position of a special interest, insistently demanding what it conceives to be for its own good and neglecting the general good. It must govern itself in the long run by a broad statesmanship which seeks not only to adapt the policies of the democracy to labor's requirements, but also seeks to adapt labor's policies to the requirements of the democracy. Organized labor has political responsibilities as well as political rights. And it will neither execute those responsibilities nor win those rights until it adopts the open, honest, manly policy of placing its own representatives in our legislative bodies to criticize and be criticized, to win in fair fight or to be honorably beaten. It may appear to win greater immediate results by pursuing Mr. Gompers's policy of parasiting upon parties fundamentally inimical to labor. But that is only to waste time, and to waste besides the great opportunity of a political condition of flux, when the difficulty of organizing a new party is at its minimum.

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Who Speaks for Russia?

THE "partial" raising of the blockade against Russia, a triumph for Lloyd George and the British Labor party, does not make the world secure against repetition of our follies. The reactionaries everywhere are trying to impose conditions, to arouse distrust, to throw scares, to find new ways of interfering. Certain international plans of a far-reaching and typical nature are being prepared and will be public soon. It is most important, meantime, for Englishmen and Americans particularly, to understand some of the most essential elements of the present situation. On these topics the ignorance of our newspapers is almost complete.

Let us first meet the only plausible argument put forward by the blockadists and interventionists. It is this: If lifting the blockade works against Bolshevism, as is maintained by the liberals, why have the Bolsheviks tried to have it lifted? The answer is in part that the more desperately theoretical and uncompromising ones have not tried. Those who have been most eager to resume peaceable relations with the outside world have been the most intelligent ones, headed by Lenin, who realize that the experiment in pure communism is ended, and who prefer to face evolution, saving what they can of the revolutionary changes, rather than to seek prolongation of their arbitrary sway, at the cost of ruining Russia and in the end preparing for a reaction to the extreme right. This explanation may not pass with men who believe that men like Lenin, Krassin and Lunacharsky wear horns, but it will easily be understood by the more generous critics, who know that Lenin and some of his friends are many-sided men, regretting the sorrows of their country, and anxious to do the best they can in a difficult and contradictory world. Bolsheviks wished the blockade raised: so did anti-Bolsheviks, from Kerensky to Berkenheim. Both sides wished to help Russia and were willing to take some chances. The Russians who welcomed intervention and blockade were mostly expropriated aristocrats, who could hope little from any democratic government.

Now it must be remembered that when Mr. Berkenheim came to this country, the Soviet government had not won its conclusive victories. It certainly could not at that time have dared to offend 25,000,000 cooperatives by interfering with relief of Russia. Had it done so it would have made probable its military overthrow. Had it not done so it would have seen in the public a gradual increase in sanity, strength, and independence. Today it is far stronger, but even now it cannot control the distribution of products by the cooperatives. It never has been able to do so. Of course, when the interventionists hope for a technical and aggressive defiance of the Soviet government by the cooperatives they show themselves more interested in their political bias than in helping Russia or the world. Our attempt to tie them up in political controversy is wholly evil. They have never supported any government. They have acquiesced in whatever the de facto government was, but have refused to permit any such government, whether of Lenin or Kolchak, to assume control of them. They have been able to defy any attempt at governmental control for the simple reason that their products were needed and that the members clearly would not work and produce unless they were allowed to manage their business themselves as usual. Whatever seems to oppose this statement is propaganda. The Kolchak people invented spokesmen for the cooperatives, to try to show that the cooperatives were backing Kolchak. The Bolsheviks formed a make-believe communist cooperative association of their own, to pass resolutions putting the cooperatives under the central government. The real cooperatives held their ground. They have been supplying over a quarter of the necessities used by the Russian people. *The Central government has been supplying probably less than 2 per cent: my best figures say 1½ per cent.* Over two-thirds has been supplied by individual small private traders, called "speculators" by the Central government. They, to a large extent, constitute the "new bourgeoisie" of which Lenin's speeches have been full.

I wish our interventionist editors would fix their intellects on the following events. The so-called cottage industries play a very important part in the life of Russia, and include many of the articles most needed by the peasants. In 1915 there were 15,000,000 peasants engaged in cottage industries, mainly farmers filling in their winter time. During the early part of the Bolshevik regime the local bodies representing these cottage industries decided to create a central body, to study demand and to give information about requirements and market conditions. This permanent bureau called a congress in May, 1918, in Moscow. It invited the Kustars, or persons who make things at home, the cottage industrials; and the Kustar cooperatives, or those cottage industrials who are organ-

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ized cooperatively. It also invited representatives of the municipal and social organizations which have business relations with the Kustars. The meeting agreed upon the need for an all-Russian Cooperative Council, which should have for its end the organization of cottage industries and of small industries into artels, or unions. The difficulties growing out of political conditions were fully discussed. The greatest difficulty was not the futile effort at control, but the lack of certain raw materials. There has been some successful interference with the cooperatives getting what they needed of those raw materials which are produced by large units, since that class of materials can be seized by the government. The raw materials that are local in their origin are in the control of the individual farmers and local bodies, and the government has not been able to interfere. The movement in May led to what was called a "Constituent Assembly," in July, 1918. It represented a combination that now includes:

1) All the big central cooperative associations.

2) The Moscow Narodny bank. The bank building itself was seized by the Bolsheviks, but they got an empty shell and the bank business goes on cooperatively as before. This seizure had no effect except as a basis for misleading Bolshevik propaganda and misleading reactionary propaganda in this country.

3) The All-Russian Union of Consumers Societies. This is the most important organization and it is one of which Mr. Berkenheim is vice-president.

4) Many local cooperatives and their artels.

This congress went ahead to introduce system into the cottage industries. It sought to take away the fortuitous nature of cottage production and distribution and to study the relation of any branch to the whole industrial situation in the nation or the region.

Now there happened something of extreme interest. The government monopolies, except those absolutely necessary for warfare, mostly failed, or were sacrificed to the needs of war. *The enterprises of these allied cooperative groups grew in volume and success in their former fields and they increased also in what had formerly been the field of big business.* On these cooperative and semi-cooperative bodies the public had to depend for leather and felt boots, for coats, heavy gloves, worsted mittens, stockings, wheels, rope, locksmiths' materials, wearing material, wood utensils, pottery. To one who realizes how completely they are related to the life of all Russia it seems incredible that outside governments should refuse to leave them to settle for themselves their relation to the central government. In other words any condition about distribution made by outside governments in permitting trade will be a damaging folly. The interventionists are against a dilemma. Sometimes they say all the people of Russia oppose the Soviets. All right, then allow these bodies, by far the best existing representatives of the Russian people, to strengthen themselves for the contest in their own way. Or the interventionists say, perhaps, that the cooperatives are really pro-Bolshevik. This is not true, but if it were, the answer to the interventionists would be as complete. *These bodies are in a full sense the Russian people.* The Russian people are not the few hundred bejewelled ex-patriots in foreign capitals drinking expensive wine and telling about their sufferings. The organizations we have been discussing are in the closest relations with the League of Cities and the Zemstvos, whom they supply with the essentials of living. We bark about a constituent assembly, meaning a collection of politicians representing political groups that no longer have any meaning, since the parties of the future in Russia are yet to be formed out of the issues of the future. A constituent assembly in a deeper sense clearly exists and the Entente, in its blind ignorance, up to January, refused to work with it. When the British government began, timidly to feel its way, the immediate American contributions were hostility and noise.

The failure of the big industries in Russia, and the success of the small industries, will have important consequences in the future. It may well be that if we are really through backing revolutionary generals, blockading, and generally messing things up, Russia herself will quickly evolve into just about what the Russian peasant wants. Her experience may even offer suggestions in certains ways to us about what we want. Take one example. There exist Russian societies for the joint buying of machines, machines being of all outside products what Russia most needs. Suppose some firm in a western country wishes to sell machines to these societies, taking what risk there is. What possible right has the government to stop the trade? In one of General Smuts's noblest speeches, appeared these words:

> "Russia can only be saved internally by Russians themselves, working on Russian methods and ideas. . . Our military forces, our lavish contributions of tanks, and other war material may temporarily bolster up the one side, but the real magnitude of the problem is quite beyond such expedients. . . . It may well be that the only ultimate hope for Russia is a sobered, purified, Soviet system and that may be far better than the Tsarism to which our present policy seems inevitably tending."

It was long, sad months after those words were written that there came the decision of the Paris

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Council to enter into relations with European Russia. The Council, in choosing the spokesman of the cooperatives and their affiliated bodies, chose *the spokesman for bodies that represent fully four-fifths of all the families in Russia;* probably considerably more. These bodies are a genuine growth of Russia's history. In some aspects their beginnings run back for centuries. They actually *are* the millions of Russia. They carry in themselves her traditions, her continuity. They are her productiveness, her labor. When they speak, Russia speaks. *And they have spoken.* Until their spokesmen ask us to object to the role of Litvinov, or to any other political arrangement, it is not for us to interfere.

If in our bitterness we tell lies about what they have said, or close our eyes to it, we increase a crime already black. Their relations to Lenin and to Lenin's successors are for them to understand, for them to solve. To us belongs remorse for our past sins; sins that are daughters of ignorance, fear, and hate. To us belongs such help as comes from normal intercourse, with no political bias, with profound humility about our own powers of understanding. In order to protect Russia and the world from future mistakes by us of the west there is just one thing we must be able to understand; that the Russian people can be reached, and that the Russian people have spoken, so clearly that all can hear except those whose ears are stopped in grim and bitter wrath.

NORMAN HAPGOOD.

An Academic Problem Solved at Last

IT REQUIRED but twenty minutes for the new and exciting mode of transportation of 1930 to whisk me from Forty-second Street to the campus of Harvale College. I at once sought the office of the Dean, from whom the magazine that employs me wished a statement regarding the success of the new system of college financing which had been quietly in operation for nearly a year.

I found the Dean genial and talkative.

"No," said he, in answer to my question, "there is no sort of objection to making the matter public now. We kept it quiet at first just to make sure not to advertise a failure. We also feared the parents' disapproval of publicity. Now that the system is working with phenomenal success, I should be glad to have other colleges benefit by our experience."

"Has the new system improved the scholarship as well as the business administration?" I asked.

"Emphatically yes," answered the Dean. "Glance for a moment at our records. You will see, by comparing these two columns, that where formerly only one out of a hundred boys gained marks above 90 per cent in studies, now nearly six out of a hundred do. In the past, only 20 per cent passed the required grade of 70 per cent in all studies; now nearly 27 per cent pass. The scholarship is what you might call 'humming.'

"Then, too, an excellent advantage of the new system is that no boy is ever dropped for deficient scholarship. He is simply fined. We notice that, with the college finances benefitting by the number of boys whose marks are low, the standard is exacted much more relentlessly. Formerly there was, we must admit, a certain softness in dealing with some boys. We liked having them, and it simplified our problems to let them pass. Now, when they fail, down go their marks. In view of this you will note that the increase of 7 per cent in the number of students passing our required grade is especially gratifying.

"We no longer drop or expel the low-stand boys. We fine them. In most cases the fathers pay this fine promptly and gladly. It saves the disgrace of having a son sent home. It also saves us the embarrassment of removing boys and thus depleting our numbers."

"I can see that," I assented, "but how do the faculty like it? Do they not find themselves cluttered with a lot of unworkable material?"

"Of course, of course," agreed the Dean, blandly. "It may be they are sometimes annoyed a little. But the advantages out-weigh such small inconveniences. A more liberal allowance of cuts relieves our classes of a good proportion of such dead-wood. The great compensation, however, is that we are now able to pay every professor a living wage, even the lowest of which is fully equal to that of any expert automobile or airplane mechanic. We can pay promptly and regularly, too. That relieves the professors from all sorts of makeshifts, such as menial work, hack writing, and petty economies. Many of them can even keep a Ford car! This more liberal system of salaries frees a man and lets him make his courses his chief work. He consequently does better teaching, is happier and more stimulating in his manner, and does not grumble. The boys most certainly learn more—yes, indeed they do. Oh, everything is working out splendidly!"

The Dean's enthusiasm threatening to cheat me out of the facts I had come to get, I interposed a question. "Will you not explain your system in detail?" I asked. "My notion of it is very hazy."

"With the greatest pleasure," replied he, "as

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well as considerable pride. I flatter myself I have had some small part in making it a success. The whole idea may seem intricate to one not acquainted with it, but really it is very simple.

"First, let me show you the situation that confronted us. You will then be better able to appreciate the necessity for the new system. For years and years we struggled along, trying in every possible way, by increasing tuitions and begging endowments to make the college self-supporting. We gathered in every penny we could, and yet we were never able to make both ends meet. Finally we called in an efficiency expert. After looking the ground over, he announced that our trouble was a lack of business psychology. That angered Professor Mentis, who thereupon left the meeting;—but we could not help that.

"Then the expert gave us, most convincingly, the result of his observations. He said that we had been working on the wrong assumption. We had assumed that the boys came to college to be educated, that they were willing to pay for an education, and that it was our duty to give it to them. Nothing, said he, could be further from the facts. Boys came to college to be 'in college'. That was the only thing that mattered to them, and that mattered very much indeed. It mattered so much that they would be willing to pay for it, and pay high. They would pay so high that we could, if we wished, furnish education free to the small number that wanted it, and not miss what we were giving. 'Tax and fine the boys who are so eager to be 'in college',' said he. 'Make them pay well. You can get all you want. You have a veritable gold mine. Midas was not in it. Try it, and in six months I expect to see Harvale booming. It will be one of the best businesses in America.'

"So we took his suggestion and tried it. Has it worked? Look at this sheet of receipts and expenditures. All salaries increased, a new group of buildings going up, several laboratories projected—all problems solved! Everybody happy!

"In detail, the system works like this: Every boy who maintains an average of 90 per cent or over in his studies gets his tuition free. Every boy who gets a mark of 80 per cent, but less than 90 per cent, pays the minimum of $100 annually—a great reduction from the old tuition. The 70 to 80 per cent boys pay $300 annually, the 60 to 70 per cent pay $500, 50 to 60 per cent $1,000, 40 to 50 per cent $3,000, 30 to 40 per cent $5,000, 20 to 30 per cent $10,000 and all, who fall below 20 per cent are subject to a fine of $20,000 a year. We find that, roughly estimated, about an equal number of our students fall into each group, except the first. The 90 per cent boys, as I believe I stated, number only about 6 per cent of our three thousand students, or one hundred and eighty. The other groups number from three to four hundred each. A little computing will show you that our annual receipts from the graduated system of tuition amount to something more than fifteen million dollars. I believe it is nearly fifteen and a half million.

"The cost of bad scholarship, you see, mounts rapidly. While this cost may seem somewhat out of proportion to the drop in marks, we seem always to get the money. There are now some four hundred youths below the 20 per cent mark, and we have already received and banked their fines, amounting in all to $4,000,000. Chicago and Pittsburgh furnish a good many of these heavy payers. The fathers do not seem to protest. They want their boys in Harvale and they are willing to pay for it.

"In addition to this sliding tuition scale, we have a system of fines which is too intricate to bother you with. Cuts, in excess of a certain number, cost from $5 to $100. Certain routine misdemeanors cost a boy from $10 to $500, and so forth. We find this source of revenue very profitable.

"And the wonder of it all is that the money is so cheerfully paid. One father, in sending his check, wrote that he would gladly pay twice as much just to have his son away from home, to say nothing of having in addition the right to brag to his friends that John was in dear old Harvale!"

"I quite sympathize with him," I said. "I believe it *was* worth the money."

"Can you not stay for luncheon?" asked the Dean, affable in the face of my approval.

"Not today, thank you," said I. "I must hurry back to get these ideas before the world. The atmosphere of your academic groves is truly refreshing, but I must return to the depressing commercialism of New York. Good afternoon."

And all the way home. meditating on the pitiful waste of my own college career at Harvale, I kept saying to myself: "An eminently practical solution. I wonder no one has thought of it before. I could have got my own tuition free under such a system if I had tried, and I should now be a better man for having been jacked up to that 90 per cent mark."

E. W. PARMELEE.

Major

Violins are galloping into mountain blue
With whistling wind manes.
Come let us leap on their backs and be off
To the country of turquoise, amber—
There where one tosses off the sun at one draught,
And wears Greek garments,
And the meadows lie laughing, out
In the arms of the mountains.

CLARA SHANAFELT.

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The Sequel of the Student Revolt

AS I write, in late November, the Sino-Japanese fracas in Foochow (in which several Chinese students lost their lives and in consequence of which the Japanese landed marines who have stationed themselves in the Chinese city as well as in the foreign concession), is inflaming public feeling in China as it has not been stirred since last May. The students are again engaging in public demonstrations, and are joining with Chinese Chambers of Commerce in demanding that the people cease all social and economic intercourse with the Japanese until the latter change their course. The waning boycott is revived. It is demanded that the government declare a policy of economic non-intercourse and an embargo on imports and exports, until Japan has radically altered its policies. It is impossible to forecast the outcome. Pessimists declare that Japan is taking advantage of the situation to bring Fukien directly within her sphere of influence—an intention expressed in the Twenty-One Demands, but temporarily held in abeyance.

There are no optimists in China in the extreme sense, but the more hopeful assert that in the present state of affairs, with the Shantung question unsettled, the Consortium in its bearing upon Manchuria under discussion, and with an acute Siberian trouble on hand, the Japanese government is not looking for more trouble—especially with the eyes of the world in general upon it, and those of the American Senate in particular. Pessimists counter with the remark that it is precisely the growing influence and prestige of the United States in China that has forced the hand of the Japanese militarist expansionists to take an aggressive step, and face the world with a fait accompli; that Japan will make use of the difficulty to demand that the Chinese government put a stop, once for all, to the boycott movement; that Japanese troops, once having obtained a footing, will never be withdrawn, and that Fukien is now to go the way of Manchuria and Shantung.

Perhaps the most sinister feature is the semi-official report from Tokyo that the disturbance was deliberately started by the Chinese in order to force the Japanese to land troops, and thereby increase the prejudice against them now existing throughout the world. Official reports from the American consulate agree with Chinese reports that unarmed Chinese students were attacked by armed Japanese and Formosans under conditions which give an appearance of a planned and organized movement with at least the connivance of local Japanese authorities. Judging from the past, the chief outcome will not be immediately to establish Japan in the Province of Fukien, but to strengthen her hands in other controversies by injecting an element to be reckoned with in making a "compromise." Such is Oriental diplomacy. The gathering, as I write, of ten thousand Pekinese students for a demonstration, after a period of quiescence, gives a good opportunity to take stock of what the Student Movement has accomplished in the six months of its existence.

As an immediate political movement it has accomplished nothing beyond preventing the signing of the Peace Treaty by China. The reasons for the relative political failure are not hard to see in retrospect, however difficult it was to perceive them in the excitement and stir of last May and June. The youth and inexperience of the students; the fear of some excess which would undo what had been effected; the fear in Peking, where the movement began, that government officials (who regarded the movement not as patriotic but as a pestilential disturbance headed toward Bolshevism) would make demonstrations an excuse for abolishing the University and the Higher Schools that are the centers of liberal thought; the difficulty in maintaining continuous organized cooperation with the mercantile guilds; the natural waning of enthusiasm when the crisis was past—all these things entered in.

But it would be a great mistake to think the movement died. The active current was diverted from breaking against the political and militaristic dam. It was drawn into a multitude of side streams and is now irrigating the intellectual and industrial soil of China. In Canton and Foochow the economic boycott has been active; in Tientsin, the political ferment has retained its vitality. Otherwise the students' organizations have gone into popular education, social and philanthropic service and vigorous intellectual discussion. China has never been anything but apathetic towards governmental questions. The Student Revolt marked a temporary exception only in appearance. The hopelessness of the political muddle, with corrupt officials and provincial military governors in real control, is enough to turn the youth away from direct politics. In addition a universal feeling operates that the comparative failure of the Revo-

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lution is due to the fact that political change far outran intellectual and moral preparation; that political revolution was formal and external; that an intellectual revolution is required before the nominal governmental revolution can be cashed in. Patriotism in China has centered about the maintenance of the existence of the nation against external aggression. The Student Revolt holds that national existence can best be secured by building up China from within, by spreading a democratic education, raising the standard of living, improving industries and relieving poverty.

The external phase of the movement centers in the creation of new schools supported and taught by the students, schools for children and adults; popular lectures and direct "social service" movements; cooperation with shops to supply technical advice and expert assistance in improving old processes and introducing new arts. These activities protect the intellectual movement in getting away from all practical affairs, in getting away from politics, and guarantee it against becoming a cultural and literary side-show.

What is termed the literary revolution was under way before the Student Revolt. It aimed at a reform of the language used in books, magazines, newspapers, and public discussion. The outsider will jump to the conclusion that this means an attempt to encourage a phonetic substitute for ideographic characters. Not at all. There is a movement to supplement ideographs with phonetic signs to show their pronunciation, the aim being quite as much to standardize pronunciation as to make it easier to learn to read. But this movement arouses no such interest and excitement as the literary revolution. The latter is an attempt to make the spoken language the standard language for print. Literary Chinese is as far away from the vernacular as Latin is from English, perhaps further. It is the speech of two thousand years ago, adorned and frozen. To learn it is to learn another language. The reformers were actuated by the practical impossibility of making education really universal when in addition to the difficulties of mastering the ideographs, children in the elementary schools are compelled to get their education in terms of a foreign language. They are actuated even more by the belief that it was not possible to develop a literature which shall express the life of today unless the spoken language, the language of the people, is used. Apart from employing and enriching the vulgar tongue, it is not possible to develop general discussion of the issues of today, social, moral, economic.

Fortunately the new movement was "advertised by its loving enemies." The literary classicists saw in it the deathblow to the old moral classics, upon which China was built. They argued that the history of China is the history of its literary classics. Its unity resides in acceptance of the moral traditions they embody. To neglect them is to destroy China. The fight merged into one between conservatives and liberals in general, between the representatives of the old traditions and the representatives of western ideas and democratic institutions. Young China rallied as one man to the support of the literary revolution. It is stated that whereas two years ago there were but one or two tentative journals in the vulgar tongue, today there are over three hundred. Since last May the students have started score upon score of journals, all in the spoken tongue and all discussing matters in words that can be understood by the common man. In the columns of one of the older Chinese dailies in Peking there has lately been a discussion carried on by voluntary correspondents about a single particle that is used freely in colloquial speech—a discussion already running into ten thousands of words.

Those who know what the change from a learned language to the vernacular meant for the transition from medieval to modern Europe will not despise this linguistic sign of social change. It is more important by far than the adoption of a new constitution. Conservatism in China is not native or natural. It is largely the product of an inelastic system of memoriter education. This education has its roots in the use of a dead language as the medium of instruction. A national education conference held in October last passed a resolution in favor of having all text-books hereafter composed in the colloquial language. After this course has been followed for a generation, the judicious historian may see in it an event of greater importance than the downfall of the Manchu dynasty.

According to published summaries, social questions are uppermost in the new press. Eloquent testimony to the new-found unity of the world is seen in the amount of discussion devoted to economics and labor questions, which as yet do not exist in any acute form in China itself. Although Marx is hardly more pertinent to the present industrial situation in China than Plato, he is translated and much discussed. All the new 'isms are discussed. Ideal anarchism has many followers partly because of the historic Chinese contempt for government, partly because of the influence of French returned students who came in contact with communistic ideas in Paris. A friend who made a careful study of some fifty of the students' papers says that their first trait is the question mark, and the second is the demand for complete freedom

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of speech in order that answers may be found for the questions.

In a country where belief has been both authoritatively dogmatic and complacent, the rage for questioning is the omen of a new epoch. More than westerners realize, the interest of the Orient in the west has centered in the material progress of Europe and America, in machines for industry and war. There was no belief that the west was superior in other respects. Only within the last year or two has the idea become general that western ideas and modes of thought are more important than western battle-ships and steam-engines. This belief is concentrated in the intellectual side of the Student Movement, though it shows itself not in any great zeal for western ideas, as such, but in a desire for such knowledge of them as will facilitate discussion and criticism of typical Chinese creeds and institutions. One incident, out of a multitude must suffice to show that the demand for freedom of thought and speech has a definite practical significance. China took over from Japan the law for assemblies which Japan had taken over from Germany. A discussion club applied to the Peking police authorities for a permit, stating that the object was consideration of the newer currents of world thought. The authorities refused the permit on the ground that newer currents must mean Bolshevism, anarchism and communism and that consideration of such topics was dangerous.

As is always the case, official opposition stimulates the movement of ideas. The menace of autocracy from within and without gives edge and fire to the hunger for new ideas. The eagerness grows for knowledge of the thought of liberal western countries in just the degree in which the powers near at hand in Tokyo and Peking seem to symbolize an intellectual creed which the world has outgrown. The more the so-called political revolution exhibits itself as a failure, the more active is the demand for an intellectual revolution which will make some future political revolution a reality. The thing that time makes stand out most in the Student Revolt it its spontaneity. The students met discouragement on all sides. Even their teachers and advisers among the returned students from America were inclined at first to wet-blanket their ardor. Its spontaneity is the proof of its genuine and inevitable nature. When most political in its outward expression, it was not a political movement. It was the manifestation of a new consciousness, an intellectual awakening in the young men and young women who through their schooling had been aroused to the necessity of a new order of belief, a new method of thinking. The movement is secure no matter how much its outward forms may alter or crumble.

Peking, China. JOHN DEWEY.

A COMMUNICATION

Johnson for President

SIR: I have now read two editorials of yours in which you dwell on the merits of your Presidential candidate, including merits which you are sure he will turn out to have if he is as clever as you are sure he is. I would not dispute these merits. I esteem your candidate humbly and highly. I ponder and applaud his extraordinary assemblage of qualities. A scientific technical man and yet, nevertheless, a successful practical administrator of businesses—a successful practical administrator of the details of properties and yet also an initiator of the ideas that lead to financial fortunes—an initiator of such ideas, suitable to private enterprise, and yet also an initiator and accomplisher of ideas and methods suitable to public administration in public office—a public administrator, able to make the wheels of government go round, and yet also a man with a mind open to at least a consideration of the political and industrial ideas which might produce a few wheels of a different social pattern from those which he has learned to turn—seldom, I should think, does one see a person combining so many qualities usually possessed singly. I stand and marvel at the feats of your candidate. I only say:

What about the feats of my candidate?

I think that among really prominent Presidential candidates there are only two about whom it can be commendingly said they have displayed a capacity for being interested by the kind of project or policy which interests the New Republic. One of these candidates you have mentioned—Herbert C. Hoover. I mention the other—Hiram W. Johnson.

I am not suggesting Mr. Johnson as a rival to Mr. Hoover in your Presidential affections. I merely note what seems to me to be a gap in your paper at the spot where you should express pleasure in the really striking similarity between certain of your principles and certain of Mr. Johnson's, and where you should rejoice that Mr. Johnson is also running (and even more openly than Mr. Hoover) toward the White House.

You, Sir, have been especially interested, I claim, in three great—and, I dare threadbarely to say, supreme—issues. I state them, as theses, under correction, thus:

1. The preservation of civil liberties in America is an essential preliminary to any missionary effort by America for blessing the world with liberty and democracy.

2. Coercive foreign adventures—such as our invasion of Russia—are destructive of the whole body of whatever saving message America may have in it to deliver to mankind.

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3. The Covenant of the League of Nations, to be saving instead of damning, must be conceived—re-conceived—in the spirit of mankind not Allied and Associated and predatory but catholic and universal and free.

I claim that on all of these three points Mr. Johnson has gone far beyond any other Presidential candidate in courageous loyalty and in effective serviceablenesss to principles and to results which you would like to see established and achieved and which you have commended with a most especial and unusual zeal to your readers.

The essence of civil liberties is liberty of opinion and of the expression of opinion. I remind you now that at those peculiar moments when to speak for liberty of opinion was peculiarly dangerous, Mr. Johnson was among the few who embraced that danger and embraced it without pause.

In the spring of 1917, when the first machinery for racking and wrenching the mind of America into its present distorted shape was about to be set up, Mr. Johnson, on the floor of the Senate, publicly, declared the special value of free-speech in war-time. He was not among those who found free-speech good only as an ornament of leisure and a toy of play-time. He found free-speech good also as a staying sail in a storm. He showed that he understood the primary eternal reason for free speech. He said:

"*In this day* the preservation of free speech and the preservation of a free press are of *more* than ordinary importance. Of *transcendent* importance is it, whenever there is *a time of stress,* whenever there is *excitement,* whenever there are *enthusiasms in which we lose our judgment,* that we should protect these fundamentals of democracy."

The italics I add to that sentence I add to indicate that Mr. Johnson's advocacy of free speech had in it the spirit of understanding as well as the spirit of his own resentment of the spectacle of man in man's chains. A year later he again showed that understanding; and he spoke with the tongue of a true prophet of the events which the denial of free speech has subsequently brought upon us. He said, speaking of the new additional espionage law of 1918:

"Measures such as this do not unite a people. They breed discontent. They cause suspicion to stalk all through the land. They make the one man the spy upon the other; they take a great virile people and make that people timid and fearful."

I ask you: do not such words show an understanding of the human mind and heart valuable beyond all other knowledge and verified to the last detail by the shameful unmanly panic in which the spirit of America has lately moved?

Mr. Johnson continued:

"Let disloyalty be punished. But do not put fear into a brave man's heart. Do not padlock his lips when he is doing his best. Do not instill into him the distrust and suspicion that this kind of measure will put into human beings. Do not let men who have ulterior motives sneak around dark corners to fasten something upon others. Leave us in this time of stress the right to talk from our hearts honestly and loyally, even if it be in abuse of any part of the Government of the United States. Leave to the American citizen the right still to be an American citizen."

He is emotional. Yes. And one twinge of the heart, if it is a heart, will often do more for a great country in a great crisis than many pains in the head. I claim it is as true for countries as for persons that the things of the heart are the things to seek first and that the other things may then perhaps be added. I have seen them added to Mr. Johnson.

He knew little about Russia. I am willing to admit that in knowledge of Russian national and international facts he was greatly inferior to any number of Russian experts who occur to my memory and all of whom were wrong about our futile adventure in Russia while he was totally and innocently and undeviatingly right. He knew one thing which expertness seems so often to cloud. He knew how people feel. He knew how people feel when their country is invaded; because he himself has lost none of the feelings which man, as man is made, has; and he knew the limits beyond which in the end the feelings of the American people would not tolerate remote adventures in bloody beneficence. I remind you of some of the things he said then; and I remind you that he was by no means unaware of the accusations which would follow upon his saying of them. He said:

"I am quite aware that the most respectful, modest and hesitating inquiry upon the subject of Russia will be met with accusations of Bolshevism."

It was—ridiculously, and, of course, in the end, vainly. But I doubt if you will find any other Presidential candidate who faced and endured so much obloquy for any cause in which you are interested as Mr. Johnson faced and endured when first among our political great ones he dared to ask our American secret diplomacy what it was doing with American lives at Archangel and in Siberia.

He is accused of wailing and weeping about "our boys" in Russia. All right. The only statesman who stood up alone to get our troops out of Russia was a statesman who did have unstatesmanly tears in his eyes when he talked about "our boys" there. And he did indeed fail to see the nice necessity of cooperation with the Allies in the reversal of Allied and Associated policy in Russia. But that necessity was so nice that in practice it did not exist.

In practice it was impossible to arrive at any cooperation with the Allies in the reversal of Russian policy because they were wedded to their idols and would not be separated from them till their idols fell and broke. The event at last was that the Allies simply got out of Russia. The event at last was that the Americans simply got out of Russia. And if we had got out when Mr. Johnson started making it popular for us to get out, the Allies would have got out sooner. The simple issue simply was, in practice, as life proved: get out.

I am willing to take a President who is right on the simple issues, and I rest in the belief that simplicity of attack on the world's difficulties will almost always be found to be the most helpful of companions on the simple and broad and un-nice routes along which those difficulties rock and roll to their rough conclusions.

I do not mean for any fraction of one moment to imply that Mr. Hoover is wrong on the simple issues. I only ask you to print a long editorial congratulating the country on how serenely—I mean how tumultuously—right Mr. Johnson has been on them, Mr. Johnson who is now seeking your suffrages, fellow-citizens. Back in 1918,

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in December of 1918, when Germany had been defeated, and when the mania was at its height for going into the uttermost parts of the earth to arrange everybody's government for him in accordance with the ideals of Germany's conquerors, then, even then, Mr. Johnson said to the Senate:

"I warn you against the policy of endeavoring to impose by military force upon the various peoples of the earth the kind of government we desire for them. We have broken one nation which started to impress its will upon others. Its fate is a warning to every nation of the world that military force shall not impose one nation's will upon another. . . . We will hear much, in the days to come, about 'stabilizing' governments. And the 'stabilization' will always be by hostile invasion and overpowering military forces. I want none of this for America."

Long applause from me. A dash of "provincialism" in it? Most certainly. And I say that at this present moment, when the idealistic forces do the arguing and predatory forces do the acting of internationalism, there is more security for the final world-mission of the United States in Senator Johnson's "provincialness" than in any of the preaching which promiscuously encourages our people to cross all oceans to inflict their own provincial ideas on other peoples by force of arms or by the filthier force of economic blockade—and which in practice will encourage them to cross principally the Rio Grande.

Liberty and self-determination at home; abstinence from the quenching of self-determination abroad:—I call it a good start, I call it the only good and safe start, and so do you, to any internationalism worth having. Mr. Johnson, on his record in the matter of the espionage laws, and on his record in the matter of the invasion of Russia, has made that start with a public clearness and ampleness which your candidate, I admit, in view of his association with Mr. Wilson's administration, could not easily emulate. I mention these matters therefore with no eye to the drawing of contrasts but only objectively for pure proof of Mr. Johnson's moral claim to a handsome and spacious residence of his own in your columns as the only important Presidential champion who has ever gone and got wounded on behalf of your free-speech and independent-Russia policies.

You have differed with him in the course of his fight on the League of Nations. So have I. And I remember that when I used to argue with him to try to persuade him of the exigent importance of forming an organ of international conference and action, his answers often seemed to me to be rather astray. I reflect now that they were not so far astray as they seemed.

Mr. Johnson was refusing to bring his mind to bear on the noble functionings of an organ in which nobility was to be secreted from tissues dirty and diseased. He began with the tissues. He began with the manifested fact—manifested to him sooner than to me—that international cooperation, when the great rulers of the great nations of today get together in a room, is not international free mutual cooperation at all but mere international partitionary predatory meddlesomeness. He began with the simple elements of the human situation; and, just as his simplicity has been justified by the event in Russia, so I think we can now see it beginning strongly to be justified by the event of the debate on the Treaty with Germany and on the Covenant of the League of Nations.

On June 2nd of last year he said to the Senate:

"This is not a league of nations to prevent war. It is a league of nations in a gigantic armed trust. In its very creation it has been stripped of every idealistic purpose it ever had. It contains within itself the germs of many wars and, as in the Shantung decision, it rivets the chains of tyranny upon millions of people and cements unjust and wicked annexations for all time. *It is a great world economic trust wherein a few men sitting in secret may control the economic destinies of peoples.* It is not a league of peoples, nor does it anywhere concern itself with peoples. *It is a trust of existing present power. It will sanctify power in a new, a terrible and a sinister sense.*"

Is it not astonishing that a man so unlearned in international affairs could have come so quickly to a view now so much more tardily reached by an ever increasing number of the well-informed? I will say that it is not astonishing. I notice learned and unlearned in favor of the Treaty. I notice other learned and unlearned against it. Knowledge is power; but clearly something else is the steering-gear and the chauffeur.

The best and most successful diplomats we have ever sent across the Atlantic were those very first diplomats of ours from our colonial Revolutionary era, most of whom knew certainly far less about international affairs and methods than their diplomatic opponents in the Foreign Offices of Europe but most of whom had native instinctive realistic penetration conjoined to a decisive pertinaceous American intent.

Such penetration, such intent, may be Mr. Hoover's as much as Mr. Johnson's. I am concerned here only to say that Mr. Johnson saw international affairs at Paris with an effectively true vision and with a publicly pronounced judgment which has been in direct line with the changes in those affairs sought by you in your writings.

You have wished to have the Treaty revised. The simple issue is: What will compel the revision? Even when certain clauses have been revised in deference to trouble in Germany, what will compel the revision of the rest of the Treaty in deference to the interests of peoples everywhere?

I will claim that anybody who makes a hall-full of Americans detest, and from their stomachs loathe, any part whatsoever of this Treaty is doing more to compel its revision than any number of virtuous intriguers who will go to Geneva and once more throw around the closeted rulers of the world, the ineffectual vapors of an idealism stale from the exhaust of Paris and appealing to the pale name of humanity without any translatable credentials from an actual humanity informed and angry and determined. I will claim that if we send this Treaty back across the ocean with a few exculpatory and personally profitable reservations draggling from it we shall simply re-enact our role of 1918 and 1919 when we entered Paris so triumphant and evacuated it so vanquished. I will claim that our delegates, scanning our reservations, will nevertheless sit as partners of the delegates from other nations—partners silent but consenting—in the operation of the iniquities of the Treaty and of the imperialistic

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meddlings of a League of Foreign Offices and State Departments, never, perhaps, using our army, but forever, as now, unconstitutionally and traitorously giving our national moral sanction to distant dirty enterprises about which we are never consulted. I will claim that the only conceivable check to the reassembled rulers and wreckers of the world is an unmistakable mandate withdrawing all American support from all sections, articles, chapters and clauses of a document totally infected with death and proclaiming in stringent and inescapable terms the elemental rules of the birth of an internationalism of peoples —peoples uninterested in meddlings and uninterested in the sanctities of the foreign speculations of little groups of wilful bankers and uninterested in the recovery of forlorn debts in Russia or elsewhere, but absolutely and inflexibly and loudly determined on the farthest possible extension of the principles of liberty and publicity at home and of non-interference and publicity abroad in an international system not perhaps stabilized in the stable of London and Paris but winning to peace through the only justification of peace—the having and the living of a free life.

I will ask you:

In the arriving at that goal, however distant *and whether we come to it by rejection of the Treaty or by ratification followed by revision,* who has done more than Mr. Johnson to create the first simple popular mood necessary—the mood of awakened suspicion and disgust and abhorrence for the treasons and stratagems and spoils of rulers inhaling and exhaling the fog of idealism and making a seamless world by dividing its garments?

The simple issue is: truth is gray, but the human routes to it are black and white. There are only two effective states of mind in this country regarding the Treaty. One is sheer acceptance with whatever reservations are forced upon it. The other is sheer rejection. I submit that it is from the latter state of mind, assertive and not complaisant, with its tail in the air and not with its head in the sand, too suspicious but not too duped and gulled, that you must get the popular force which will give you the drastically new Treaty and Covenant you want.

Your candidate, I know, has been prevented by his official ties from stirring our populace to the wrath which you have shown against his fourteen-pointless chief; but I notice that he can publicly allude to the League of Nations, and I notice that he can publicly say he favors it, and I should therefore think that until he can also say publicly that he sees its moral landslides and economic bottomless pits so publicly seen by you, he may remain your Presidential preference but he cannot remain your only Presidential possibility. I meekly suggest that you might carry two Presidential arrows in your quiver; one, the man who might have helped to make espionage laws hateful and might have helped to make the invasion of Russia hateful and might have helpel to make the spirit of the Treaty hateful, if he could have, and the other, the man who did.

Please understand that I am not disputing the immense superiority which Mr. Hoover possesses over Mr. Johnson in certain knowledges and experiences and aptitudes. Nor am I disputing Mr. Hoover's enlightened inclination toward perceiving and admitting and in some way remedying the sicknesses of the society which has blessed him with fortune and fame without cursing him with a conviction of its unerring rightness. Mr. Hoover can touch wealth without being its toady, its snob and its tool. I have defended him in your columns against such charges as the ones that Mr. Heney made against him. I am not attacking him here. My point is not your candidate but mine.

I am simply pleading: Have a heart and a word for my candidate's astonishing knowledge and experience and aptitudes; those of a man—I say—skilled in man's nature, deep in simple insight into human fraud whether at Paris or at Washington, open in simple courage against it whether at Sacramento or at Geneva, knowing that the way to the unsuccessful reformation of the government of California was not in the schedules of the reformation but in the gross announcement indiscriminatingly and devastatingly repeated: "When I am Governor of California, I will drive the Southern Pacific Railroad Company out of every inch of power in the politics of the State." I claim that he is the fellow you need to break the fellows who made that Treaty, and the reforming will come in his wake.

WILLIAM HARD.

A Lecture on Americanization

SIR: May I call attention through your columns to a lecture on Americanization: True and False, by Dr. Edward T. Devine, Monday evening, March 1st, at the MacDowell Gallery, 108 West 55th Street. This is the first time Dr. Devine will lecture on this subject in New York, and I imagine your readers will be particularly interested in hearing what the author of the eloquent Letter To The President has to say on so vital a subject. You remember how Dr. Devine declared in ringing tones that "The idea that discontent in America can be overwhelmed by force of arms is fantastic." And again, "The only possible danger to American institutions lies in the policy of suppression."

The New York Auxiliary of the National League of American Penwomen, under whose auspices the lecture is given, has for its subject the encouragement of young women authors, journalists and composers—by professional advice and social cheer. The dues are nominal and a small sum of money is urgently needed to pay for its tiny office at 5 West 47th Street, where tickets may be had for the lecture at $2.00 each. Tickets may also be obtained at my home, 28 East 75th Street.

ANNIE NATHAN MEYER,
1st Vice President.

New York City.

Lincoln

SIR: Your critique of the Lincoln play in the New Republic leads me to think that you do not really know your hero. Being a Virginian I may be partisan, but I ask you to read The Real Lincoln, by C. L. C. Minor (Everett Woddey Co., Richmond), and Facts & Falsehoods, by George Edmonds (A. R. Taylor Co., Memphis, Tenn.). It is now in order, for Lincoln Republicans to claim the honor as the pioneer Bolshevik propagandists. Their memory should be perpetuated—the men who tried to force "nigger equality" on the South. They won't be forgotten.

Baltimore, Maryland. EDMOND FONTAINE.

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Books and Things

AFTER finishing Mr. Max Beerbohm's new book, Seven Men (London: Heinemann), I tried to recall a sentence of Mr. Lytton Strachey's, couldn't, and had to look the sentence up. "There is a kind of art, as everyone knows, that conceals itself," Mr. Strachey says in his Landmarks in French Literature, "but there is another—and this is less often recognized—that displays itself, that *just* shows, charmingly but unmistakably, how beautifully contrived it is." Are not these words as applicable to Mr. Max Beerbohm's art, whether in The Happy Hypocrite, in Zuleika Dobson or now in Seven Men, as to La Fontaine's? La Fontaine, Mr. Strachey says a few pages later, "was as unsentimental as Molière himself. This does not imply that he was unfeeling: feelings he had—delicate and poignant ones; but they never dominated him to the exclusion of good sense." And this passage, too, might have been written, with only one word changed, of Mr. Max Beerbohm. "Poignant" is several shades too strong. A poignant feeling would have to be checked and toned down before it could take its place in the pattern made by his other feelings, each of which finds its place in that pattern with ease and without correction or change. Of no author is it truer that all his feelings, just as they come to him, natural, without reworking, are in harmony with the unsentimental color of his prose.

One of the most characteristic traits of Mr. Max Beerbohm's prose is directness. It is not a Greek directness. It is too malicious to be Greek. One finds things not unlike it in the eighteenth century, even in places where one would scarcely look for them, in the mouth, for example, of the Chevalier des Grieux, who adds this postscript to his disdain of riches: "Ce sentiment étoit vrai; cependant, dans le tems que je faisois si peu de cas de biens du Monde, je sentois que j'aurois eu besoin d'en avoir du moins une petite partie, pour mépriser encore plus souverainement tout le reste." This reflection is rather in Mr. Beerbohm's manner, with this difference—that while such humor surprises us in Manon Lescaut, where there is nothing else in the same key, the humor of Mr. Beerbohm's directness here or there matches exactly the humor which informs his story or his essay as a whole. He says of second-nighters, in Seven Men, that they came to the theatre, unlike the first-nighters, "rather to see than to be seen, and there was an air, that I liked, of earnestness and hopefulness about them. I used to write a great deal about the future of the British drama, and they, for their part, used to think and talk a great deal about it. People who care about books and pictures find much to interest and please them in the present. It is only the students of the theatre who always fall back, or rather forward, on the future." Throughout Savonarola Brown, from which this passage is taken, there is the same air of amused criticism.

Another thing that gives feature to four of the five stories in Seven Men is their author's love of design. Even upon his essays this love has left its mark, less distinct upon whole essays than upon single pages now and then. In the first essay, in Yet Again, Mr. Beerbohm is alone, at home, among familiar objects: "But in the whole room there are but three things living: myself, my dog, and the fire in my grate. And of these three lives the third is very much the most intensely vivid. My dog is descended, doubtless, from prehistoric wolves; but you could hardly decipher his pedigree on his mild, domesticated face. My dog is as tame as his master (in whose veins flows the blood of the old cavemen). But time has not tamed fire. Fire is as wild a thing as when Prometheus snatched it from the empyrean. Fire in my grate is as fierce and terrible a thing as when it was lit by my ancestors, night after night, at the mouths of their caves, to scare away the ancestors of my dog." What design and what economy in design! Well, Enoch Soames in Seven Men is a whole story designed with the same nicety, the same beautiful aversion to waste. Only at the end did the designer's invention run thin. But it is at the very end of Hilary Maltby, at the very end of James Pethel, that the design is fulfilled, each time by an added touch of ordered extravagance, which heightens and looks back at everything that has gone before.

Seven Men is a new departure. But each of Mr. Max Beerbohm's books is a new departure? True. True also that there are premonitions of Seven Men in The Case of Prometheus, the last essay, if it be an essay, in More. But the new stories are better constructed than The Case of Prometheus, if it be a story. Are they better constructed than Zuleika Dobson? No, but they are less inhuman, they keep you more nearly eager to know what will happen next, than that far more beautiful book, in which we do not share sympathetically in Zuleika's desire to be Helen of Troy to a modern world. Seven Men represents with more sympathy and with a more cordial ridicule several less exorbitant desires—the desire for fame, for posthumous fame if nothing nearer can be had; the desire for high society, with the dark complement of that desire, discomfort at finding oneself out of place in the place where one had longed to be; the desire to taste danger and to keep this taste fresh; the desire to be the hero of remarkable exploits. Every one who has had his moments of being a liar, a gambler, a snob, every one who has been athirst for fame, will find his despised passion understood and revived and played with and mocked at in Seven Men. A small audience, do you think? Then you have been luckier in your acquaintance than I, and especially in your self-acquaintance.

The pig, said George Meredith in his lecture On the Idea of Comedy, "the pig supplies the most popular of dishes, but it is not accounted the most honored of animals, unless it be by the cottager. Our public might easily be led to try other, perhaps finer, meat. It has good taste in song." Will Seven Men when published here bring more readers than he has ever had in this country to Mr. Beerbohm, who has long been the classic case of reputation without popularity? I hope so. I am betting that this time the "finer meat", although as fine as ever, will make its way in more markets. The seventh man in this new book is still, to be sure, as unsentimental as Molière, and that is against him. Against him, too, is the fact that he is, with all his variety, all of a piece. As little as Miss Austen is he a writer in whom you can dislike one trait while liking another. You cannot taste his sincerity apart from his artfulness, his common sense apart from his extravagance, his order and measure apart from his caprice. In Seven Men many small caprices, each as clear as a spring, hide their reason for being until they reveal it by flowing into the stream of the narrative. Throughout the most preposterous events, fantastic or supernatural, their contriver keeps his air of recording them imperturbably, just as they happened, with smiling indifference to your ability or inability to perceive that he is weaving them into the most formal of designs, into remote and intimate pictures of some of man's wishes.

P. L.

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Literary Notes

MR. Siegfried Sasson is in the United States to tell by lecture and books how the experience of war appears to him. Already he has spoken in New York and at Bryn Mawr and later he is going to Chicago. At the same time a new book of his poems, Picture Show, is to come out immediately. Like many men who see and express the irony of institutions like war, Mr. Sassoon is personally extremely modest and simple. This gives peculiar value to the extraordinarily strong picture that he has made from his experiences.

A great deal of interest is certain to await Arthur Gleason's study of British labor, What the Workers Want. For the past five years Mr. Gleason has kept in close touch with British labor—practically ever since he and Mrs. Gleason wrote their book on ambulance work in Belgium. His new work is not only an analysis of the ideas behind labor policy but an actual account of the leaders and the events on which that policy has turned. It is by all accounts the most valuable index to the state of mind which was so astonishingly indicated in Labor and the New Social Order—that manifesto from British labor which remains highwater mark in contemporary non-Russian political thought. What the Workers Want is to be published by Harcourt, Brace and Howe.

One of the prime qualifications for an American ambassadorship seems to be a previous condition of more or less innocuous literary desuetude. In the case of Mr. Norman Hapgood this qualification was not fulfilled. Hence, apparently, the appointment could not be confirmed. But Dr. Henry Van Dyke, Dr. Maurice Francis Egan, Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, and now Mr. Robert Underwood Johnson are excellent examples of the working of this fantastic American tradition. Is it true that the qualities which these mandarins supply are really the best qualifications for an American ambassador? Was Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, for example, a valuable representative of his country? Then Mr. Brander Matthews should be the next candidate.

The author of The Economic Consequences of the Peace, J. M. Keynes, pronounces his name as if to rhyme with pains. His book has already sold practically 20,000 copies, and an additional 20,000 are being rushed through. The London Athenaeum declares that the book is "a perfectly equipped arsenal of facts and arguments, to which everyone will resort for years to come who wishes to strike a blow against the forces of prejudice, delusion and stupidity." Which sounds a little like the praise that used to be bestowed on the Bible.

The best of all translators from the Russian into English, not an embarrassingly large gathering, is unquestionably Constance Garnett. The translations of Anton Chekhov's short stories, published by Macmillan, read as if they were written in English and not barbarously uprooted from another language. She will soon publish The Letters of Anton Chekhov; a collection which, even more than the Tales will give us the personality of a man who besides being an artist anxious about his work was a physician untiring in his efforts to help the people about whom he wrote.

A labor leader recently made the mournful statement that "the professors can write but they don't understand labor, while the labor leaders understand labor but can't write." This statement may possibly have to be revised since William Z. Foster is to publish a book on The Great Steel Strike. Mr. Foster's so-called "red" utterances were circulated by the thousand by the Steel Corporation during the recent strike, to show how extreme he once had been. His new book is written out of his faith that labor has to progress step by step. If this volume lives up to the possibilities of the subject and the opportunities of its author, it should be of immense help to every student of labor—including the professors.

In the good old days before the war it was customary for the United States to deport prostitutes without any more "due process" of the law than could be helped. From this it was an easy step to deporting artists who although monogamously married were not legally so. Perhaps an analogy can be made between this and the progression from the actual suppressing of Madeleine, the story of a prostitute, to the present attempt at suppressing James Branch Cabell's imaginative book Jurgen. The public tolerated the suppressing of Madeleine and even the publisher took an apologetic and obsequious tone in regard to this invasion of their rights. Encouraged by so easy a victory the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice has gone on to pursue Mr. Cabell. A stand is now being taken in the case of Mr. Cabell's book that might better have been taken in the case of Madeleine. The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice is just as blind in suspecting pornography in one case as in the other. But the morbid susceptibility to pornography that is the chief characteristic of this Society has often been shared by the judges that try such cases. There seems to be no one cure for the heresy-hunters and witch-burners, whether they profess sexual purity or anti-socialism or anti-beer or whatnot. Perhaps the gradual attainment of civilization may help the United States. As a preliminary, the exact ascertainment of what Mr. Sumner's society means by "pornographic" might be of some assistance toward securing justice for James Branch Cabell's Jurgen.

John Spargo has written a new book, Russia as an American Problem, to show that Russia needs organizing, executive help and the kind of initiative available in American engineers and technical experts. This, it would seem, is also Lenin's urgent belief. Can it be possible that Mr. Spargo is now a propagandist for Lenin?

Everyone knows the person who shouts at the ignorant foreigner, in the hope that shouted English will be English more intelligible. Mr. Thomas Czapek illustrates this point in his book on The Czechs in America. Mr. Czapek's wife learned that a Czech of "obviously low mentality" was to be found in a certain American hospital. She found—an unusually intelligent young immigrant who spoke German and French, though no English; and this youth complained bitterly of "the stupid doctor" who had bellowed in vain. Only one and one-half per cent of the immigrants from the Czech States are illiterate, according to Ellis Island reports. Mr. Czapek's work, published by the Houghton Mifflin Company, is an attempt to represent fairly the Czech element in this country.

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The Economics of the Treaty

The Economic Consequences of the Peace, by John Maynard Keynes, C. B. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe.

MR. KEYNES is a highly competent economist; his official duties at Paris brought him into first-hand contact with the problems he discusses; he writes with vigor and distinction. More than that, he is a clear-visioned liberal, and he is bitterly dissatisfied with the economic clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. His book comes with the impact of a missile. It jolts you out of any inert illusion that the world is just about ready to settle itself comfortably down again into its old grooves. It brings some grimly disquieting things squarely into your line of vision, and there is no turning away from them.

No one has painted the desperate economic situation of Europe with more sincerity or more effectively. No one has put a more certain finger upon the gravest defects of the Treaty,—its merely colorable fulfillment of solemn contracts with a defeated nation, its timorous failure to reckon with economic realities. Mr. Keynes, in short, has both knowledge and insight. I, for one, can accept most—not all—of his figures and estimates. I am very sure that I should be much better satisfied with the economic and financial clauses of the Treaty as Mr. Keynes would have drafted them than with those clauses as they stand. But with all this I cannot accept Mr. Keynes's interpretation of the real significance and necessary consequences of those clauses or of the forces of which they were the outcome.

Mr. Keynes sets his stage as though for the inevitable processes of a tragedy. But all too soon he forgets his Chorus and his Fates. His actors become mere disputants. Wrong emerges triumphant, not because such is the remorseless logic of the initial situation, but because right proves itself slower at parley and less adroit in manoeuver.

In the foreground of his scene Mr. Keynes puts the Council of Four: Clemenceau, concerned only with the safety of France and seeing safety only in supremacy; Lloyd George, sincerely desiring to do the right thing where the right thing would not embarrass him politically; Orlando, thinking (though Mr. Keynes does not say so) wholly in terms of the Italian political situation; the President, out of his element, without a specific program, insensitive to the personal reactions around him, tardy in following the shifting meaning of proposals and counter-proposals as they were tossed about. (I question the accuracy of Mr. Keynes's impression. Slow in his perception of different shades of personal attitude the President may have been. But there is much evidence of his disconcerting quickness in grasping the essential difference in two apparently similar drafts of a proposal.) Here in this situation, you gather, is the explaining of the wreck of the Fourteen Points and of the rest of the pre-armistice agreement with Germany.

What this scene lacks is a background. Mr. Keynes knows the things that should be in that background, but he tucks them away into a dim corner and forgets them. That, I imagine, is because the background is political, and Mr. Keynes is impatient of political considerations. He thinks in terms of economic right and economic wrong and personal responsibility. But the materials for a background are there:

"Any open rupture with his colleagues would certainly bring upon his head the blind passions of 'anti-German' resentment with which the public of all Allied nations were still inspired. They would not listen to his arguments. They would not be cool enough to treat the issue as one of international morality or of the right governance of Europe. The cry would simply be that, for various sinister and selfish reasons, the President wished 'to let the Hun off.' The almost unanimous voice of the French and British press could be anticipated. Thus, if he threw down the gage publicly he might be defeated. And if he were defeated, would not the final Peace be far worse than if he were to retain his prestige and endeavor to make it as good as the limiting conditions of European politics would allow him?"

That is precisely it. If Mr. Keynes had taken that dominating fact and had built it up into a real background, he would have seen that his brilliant sketch of the disputations of the Council of Four was somewhat out of drawing. It was not the adroitness of Lloyd George or the laconic single-mindedness of Clemenceau that balked the President. It was what he could see over their shoulders. Nothing less than unified and courageous leadership could have lifted public opinion in the Allied countries (including the United States) up to the level of a peace that would have been an honest fulfillment of pre-armistice pledges. Public opinion—still reacting to war stimuli—was always there, in the meeting room of the Council of Four, in the guise of "the domestic political situation." It was Clemenceau's strength and Wilson's weakness.

I come to my second ground of difference with Mr. Keynes. As he would have it, the economic clauses of the Treaty, "cumulative provisions for the destruction of highly organized economic life," are the successful embodiment of a definite French policy: "to set the clock back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished." "By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depends for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed." In its economic aspects, then, it is a Carthaginian peace. But all this is covered with pitiful sophistications, "to save the scruples or the face of the President." "The honest and intelligible purpose of French policy to limit the population of Germany and weaken her financial system is clothed, for the President's sake, in the august language of freedom and international equality."

This was, I grant, the policy of some Frenchmen. It may have been Clemenceau's policy, although I doubt that he took its possibilities very seriously. (Mr. Keynes fancies that Clemenceau "was a little contemptuous about the indemnity.") But so far as it was in fact French policy, just so far must discerning Frenchmen be disappointed with the terms of peace. Doubtless, as Mr. Keynes suggests, the French always asked, as others did, for more than they expected to get. But if they had this Carthaginian policy seriously at heart they got less than they expected.

I do not see in the economic clauses of the Treaty the expression of a carefully calculated policy. There was confusion of counsel among the French ministers who had these matters in charge. In particular there was the inevitable opposition between the desire to hamper Germany's economic restoration and the desire to secure the maximum reparation payment. Attempts to reconcile these opposites —like the proposal to put the marketing of Germany's exports into the hands of an inter-Allied pool—were hardly to be taken seriously. To explain the situation we must turn again to the background of public opinion and domestic politics.

French financial policy, based on political expediency, colored with a sound fear of the repressive effect of heavy taxation on war ardor, had drawn heavily in advance on

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the fiscal fruits of victory. These discounts were coming in for collection. All over France there was the blind cry, "Let the Germans pay our taxes!" And so the principal concern of Minister Klotz was to postpone the day when an honest (and politically catastrophic) budget would have to be presented to the Chamber. Likewise Minister Clementel (whatever else he may have wanted) welcomed an arrangement which seemed to impose substantial restrictions on Germany's commercial freedom, while leaving France unhampered. This contrasted effectively with the most-favored-nation clause of the Treaty of Frankfort, which was reciprocally binding.

Such of the French economic proposals as were incorporated in the Treaty were framed with an eye not so much to the economic future of Germany as to the French press and the Chamber of Deputies. Mr. Keynes's hypothesis of a consistent purpose imputes to those French politicians a level of statesmanship to which I do not believe they aspired. I doubt that they were looking five years ahead.

And what did they get? Appearance might serve if reality could not be had, and in large measure appearance was what, perforce, they took. (Janus-faced, the Treaty wears two masks. One is quite as deceptive as the other.) The temporary restrictions on Germany's freedom to frame her own commercial policy, obnoxious and petty though they are, can have no appreciable effect in delaying her economic recovery. To Germany's cession of her mercantile marine (one of the inevitable provisions of the Treaty) Mr. Keynes attaches an altogether exaggerated significance. "For the present," he says, "no lines will run from Hamburg, except such as foreign nations may find it worth while to establish out of their surplus tonnage." Set the date back to some year before the war, put New York for Hamburg, and then appraise the observation.

While there is much that is petty, unjust, and humiliating, there is little in the Treaty which has much bearing upon Germany's economic future, aside from the territorial cessions and the reparation clauses. And the reparation clauses are open to quite another interpretation than Mr. Keynes gives them.

I should put the total reparation payment to which Germany is liable under the pre-armistice agreements closer to $20,000,000,000 than to Mr. Keynes's estimate of $10,600,000,000. I put her capacity to pay, as he does, at $10,000,000,000. But there is nothing in her economic situation which enables one to say that a payment of twice that size, is impossible. The obstacle is the unwillingness of the claimant nations to take so large a payment in the form in which it would have to be made, that is, in German goods or in contracts for reconstruction work let to German firms.

Thus the additional charge against Germany on account of war pensions and separation allowances,— a concession to Lloyd George's pre-election entanglements,—has significance largely because it changes the basis on which the payments received are likely to be divided among the claimant nations. True, it increases the invisible figures on the blank check Germany has been forced to sign to some forty billion dollars or more. But the blank check has little value except as it served the immediate purposes of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Klotz.

In the Reparation Commission, which is to determine the amount of the actual payment, Mr. Keynes sees the garrote by which Germany is to be strangled. It may be that. Or, as some chauvinists fear, it may be the instrument of bringing the whole reparation program down to a moderate and reasonable basis. It has almost unlimited power, for good or for evil. The truth is, I infer, that when the differences at Paris over reparations came to an impasse, it was decided to leave the whole matter open, except for some face-saving provisions on one side and the other.

My judgment is that the powers of the Reparation Commission are likely to be used wisely. The dimming of war passions, the practical difficulties in the way of large collections, the imminent danger of destroying the whole economic structure of Europe, will count toward that end. The vitally important thing, however, is the development of a more intelligent and more liberal public opinion. And there lies the supreme value of Mr. Keynes's book.

I cannot leave the topic of reparation without expressing sharp dissent from Mr. Keynes's attitude toward the Belgian claims. He indicates his indifference to other than purely economic considerations when he attributes "the special position occupied by Belgium in the popular mind" to her great sacrifices in 1914, although "her relative sacrifices by the end of 1914 had fallen far behind." There are many who believe that Belgium's special position is such as to entitle her to priorities. That belief rests, not on economic, but on rather obvious moral and legal grounds.

Mr. Keynes is not merely a destructive critic. The definite remedies he proposes are conceived on a high level of statesmanship. Yet I put my hope (and expectation) of a virtual revision of the economic clauses of the Treaty in the Reparation Commission rather than the League of Nations. It is a relatively small body, a little further removed from the atmosphere of international politics, and more directly in contact with the tragic and compelling facts.

The cancellation of inter-Ally indebtedness, I have come to think, is not only wise but probably inevitable. But neither this step nor the new international loan which Mr. Keynes suggests should be seriously considered, or even proposed, at this time. Most of the initial burden will fall upon the United States, and we ought to know very definitely just what order of things in Europe we are asked to support. Here lies our opportunity,—greater in some ways than we had in 1917 or 1918. Even if the Treaty stands as it is, the real world settlement remains to be made.

As against Mr. Keynes's brilliancy, insight, and courage, there must be put certain elements of strain, of exaggeration, of effort for dramatic consistency. But for all that his book is like nothing so much as a fresh breeze coming into a plain where poisonous gases are yet hanging.

ALLYN A. YOUNG.

In and around Art

Essays in Art, by A. Clutton-Brock. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.

ONLY a small public is interested in a book like Mr. Clutton-Brock's. Messrs. Scribner's do not print the book on this side. They import sheets from England, and publish a small edition here—and probably fail to sell all of their small edition. Mr. Clutton-Brock is not known, in spite of the fact that these related essays had first place in the London Times Literary Supplement. He is not, at any rate, widely known, and his subject (Art!) sounds a little dreary. Yet his is a book worth thinking about, very straight and sober and sincere, discussing one of the most serious of all subjects in a manner worthy of the subject. Had Mr. Brock a more exuberant or striking

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manner, or more an air of public instructor or spiritual traffic policeman, he might carry his words to more of the satiated and ginger-demanding public. But the absence of ginger, the utterly Anglican abstinence from and avoidance of ginger, does not alter the substance of his discourse. That substance is sound and solid, and rewards the reader.

Mr. Brock steers between Whistler and Tolstoi in his social conception of art. He agrees with Whistler's Ten o'clock lecture that the public must not tell the artist what he is to do; but he thinks Whistler erroneous in arguing that the public has nothing to do with art. "The account he [Whistler] gives of the decadence of art is historically untrue as well as unintelligible. . . . All we know of more primitive art goes to prove that it was, and is, practised not by a special class but by the ordinary primitive man in his leisure. Peasant art is produced by peasants, not by lonely artists. Some, of course, have more gift for it than others, but all enjoy it though they do not call it art. Whistler saw himself in every primitive artist; and seeing himself as a dreamer apart, misunderstood by the common herd, he saw the primitive artist as one living in a primitive White House, and producing primitive nocturnes for his own amusement, unnoticed, happily, by primitive critics." So much for the aristogogic Whistler. With Tolstoi, on the other hand, Mr. Brock agrees that a public with a right relation to the artist will help the artist to have a right relation to the public. But he denies that the criterion of good art can be rural plebiscite. "There is no multitude of simple, normal, unspoilt men, able and willing to enjoy any real art that is presented to them. The right experience of art comes with effort, like right thought and right action; and no Russian peasant has it because he works in the fields." The artist's business, Mr. Brock insists, is "not to find an audience, but to find the right attitude towards one, the attitude which is that of the artist and not of the tradesman, or peacock, or philanthropist." "He is not a public servant, but a man speaking for himself." For himself, yet to an ideal audience—"a work of art claims an audience, entreats it, is indeed made for it; but must have it on its own terms."

With this social conception of art, one rightly expects that Mr. Brock's criticism will be the same in kind as the noble and spacious criticism of William Morris. Behind it there is no recondite aesthetic theory. Instead, one finds the moralist asking, How are we to improve the art of our own time; and the teacher declaring, By cultivating our minds and souls. This insistence on the soul is responsible for some of Mr. Brock's best feeling, and also, it must be said, for some of his loosest thinking. The danger of his method is the danger of all pulpiteering—the game of issuing inspirational currency without sufficient intellectual gold in the bank.

Nothing is so seductive for the moralist, whether he be a Cecil or a Lenin, as the carte blanche of radical denunciation. Take, for example, Mr. Brock's custom of indicting the age—which is certainly quite as luxuriously uncritical as the custom of indicting an unfavored nation. He speaks dolefully of our modern "poverty of experience." He refers censoriously to "the will for action that has ousted the will to experience." He denounces this as "the error of the whole Western world." He is extremely severe about the "very curious disease that has become endemic in the whole of Europe;" namely, "we have lost the power of knowing what we like—that is to say, the power of loving." "How," he ponders, "how are we to recover for the artist the virtues of the craftsman and for the craftsman the virtues of the artist?" And, again, the "female control of art began, as I have said, at the mistress-ridden court of Louis XV"—rather an easy generalization.

The pulpiteer tends to take his assumptions for granted, tends to announce grandly that "wisdom always goes contrary to what our passions tell us," or to declare readily that art is "a recognition of something greater than man." But while Mr. Brock has this preaching-teaching defect of sententious utterance, it is not at all the defect of a pompous or self-important or self-righteous man. It is merely his moral earnestness getting the better of him, even when he speaks as a plain member of the general public, thinking only in the interest of art. His earnestness is on the whole admirable. He is thoroughly inspiring on the importance of the person, as against the "process." He has courage, in the name of art, to put humanity before the empire or the church or the state or anything else. He bravely refuses to consider that humanity is "inconsistent with the process that dominates the world," and he even asserts that "all our values come from the sense of person as more real than process. We will not do wrong to a man because he is a man; if he is to us only part of a process, we cannot value him and we can do what we will to him without any sense of wrong." This is ethical discourse, leading to the generalization that "art springs always out of a supreme value for the personal and is an expression of that value"—a conclusion quite clearly ethical, hard to test on such objects as pottery or chairs, yet delighting one with the fine and flexible consciousness from which alone such a conclusion could come.

This same order of consciousness is later manifested in Mr. Brock's strictures on professionalism. "Our museums are cumbered with monstrous monuments of past professionalism; our bookshelves groan with them. Always we are trying to like things because they seem to us very well done; never do we dare to say to ourselves: It may be well done, but it were better if it were not done at all; and the artist is still to us a dog walking on his hind legs, a performer whose merit lies in the unnatural difficulty of his performance." Here again, one feels, Mr. Brock is urging his readers to a healthy resentment—a resentment against those conditions which most handicap the creation and appreciation of beauty, conditions which must preoccupy the best democratic critics like Mr. Brock.

He finds them in professionalism, in the war mind, in the snob, in the Pompadour in art, in the tradesman, in the pedant, in the classicist, in the demagogue. By discussing Leonardo da Vinci and Poussin and Mozart, he shows the felicities he is capable of appreciating and the sincerity and expressiveness he upholds: and by maintaining that art depends on a state of society as well as a state of mind he prepares the way for just the mixture of human and aesthetic comment which is his own. It is not so vigorous as the good English tradition of Ruskin and Morris might lead one to expect. Mr. Brock is not sweeping, not flowing, not even running in his movement. He is direct, quiet, modulated, with a minimum of gesture or exclamation. But whatever his method he stands in no awe of the culture he possesses. He puts men and women before everything and then invites them to humility; he holds art made for them but only on the terms that they respect themselves; and he indicates the lawlessness and ignorance and ugliness and illusion that deprive men of freedom—freedom, the basis of personality and hence the basis of good art. In such terms, but admirably, he exalts the reader, leaving him with a certain depressing sense of Anglican asceticism and yet a belief in the general fitness of Essays on Art. F. H.

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